Epistemic landscapes · division of cognitive labour

Mavericks

A field of research is a landscape. Every patch is an approach somebody could take, and its height is how much that approach turns out to be worth. Nobody can see the landscape. The only way to learn what an approach is worth is for somebody to spend their career on it.

The rules

Two ways to choose what to work on

A follower looks at the approaches near theirs that somebody has already tried, and moves to whichever paid best. A maverick refuses to work anywhere anybody has worked before, and goes somewhere nobody has been.

Weisberg and Muldoon (2009) found that a community of followers explores very little, and that adding a modest share of mavericks transforms how much of the field gets covered. That reads as a formal argument for funding people who go their own way, and it was received that way.

Alexander, Himmelreich and Thompson (2015) replied that the comparison was rigged by accident: the follower rule performs worse than moving at random, so almost anything looks good beside it. The third strategy on this page is wanderers, who simply move somewhere adjacent for no reason, and they are the whole argument.

Start from
Round
0
not started
Worthwhile field tried
—
of what was worth trying
Best approach found
—
the ring on the map
Ground covered
—
worthwhile or not
The field
Followers Mavericks Wanderers
What gets covered drag or arrow keys to replay
Worthwhile approaches tried All ground covered
The three strategies
The disputed comparison
Things worth trying

Four runs and one comparison

Press Everyone follows
They clump. Followers converge on whatever their neighbours found and the rest of the field stays dark. About a third of the worthwhile approaches ever get tried.
Press A quarter mavericks
The field lights up. About two and a half times as much of it gets tried, on the same number of researchers over the same number of rounds. This is the result that made the paper.
Now press Everyone wanders
Just as much of the field gets covered, by researchers doing nothing more clever than moving at random. That is the objection, and it is not subtle: most of what a maverick contributes is simply not being a follower.
Press Compare four communities
Both numbers side by side. Mavericks beat followers by a wide margin; wandering beats followers by nearly the same margin. The gap between mavericks and wanderers is small enough to argue about, which is what people have been doing.
Press Followers on a larger field, then set wanderers to 100%
The reversal. On a field this size followers still reach the best approach nearly every time and wanderers mostly do not. Refusing to revisit anything means never following a slope upward. Breadth and depth are different achievements and no strategy here has both.
The argument

Why anyone cares

This is the page with the most direct practical claim on the site. If it is right, funding bodies should deliberately support work that nobody else is doing, and the argument for that is formal rather than sentimental.

Why a division of labour is not obvious

Kitcher (1990) posed the problem: a community where every researcher independently pursues the approach most likely to pay will pile onto the same one, and that is collectively worse than a spread even though each individual choice was correct. Individual and community rationality come apart. What is wanted is some mechanism that produces a spread without anybody having to intend it.

Weisberg and Muldoon's contribution was to model the landscape explicitly and let the spread come from a difference in behaviour rather than from a central planner. Their mavericks are not more insightful than anyone else. They are simply constitutionally unwilling to work where others have worked, and that alone is enough to cover the field.

The reply, which is about controls

Alexander, Himmelreich and Thompson noticed that the follower rule in the original model performs worse than random movement. Once you notice that, the comparison stops establishing what it appeared to: the mavericks were not beating a reasonable scientist, they were beating a badly specified one.

Most of what a maverick contributes here is not being a follower, and moving at random does that too.

The comparison above bears this out. A quarter mavericks roughly triples what a follower community covers, and a community of wanderers achieves nearly the same. Whatever is doing the work, it is not the maverick's distinctive refusal; it is any behaviour at all that stops researchers clumping.

What neither side quite says

Change what you measure and the ranking inverts. On a larger field, followers reach the single best approach almost every time and wanderers mostly do not, because hill-climbing is what exploits a slope once you are standing on one, and a maverick who never revisits anything can never climb.

So there is no strategy here that is simply better. Followers are good at finishing and bad at looking; mavericks and wanderers are the reverse. A community wanting both needs both, which is a more modest conclusion than the original paper and a more useful one than the reply. It also relocates the question: not whether mavericks are valuable, but what mixture is, and that depends on facts about the field that nobody inside it can see.

What this model is not

The landscape here is fixed, smooth, and has a single best answer that exists before anybody looks. Real research changes what is worth doing as it proceeds, has no defined maximum, and the value of an approach depends on what else has been established. Researchers here have no funding, no careers, no collaborators and no ability to change strategy. Nobody has an idea.

References

Sources

  1. Alexander, J. M., Himmelreich, J., & Thompson, C. (2015). Epistemic landscapes, optimal search, and the division of cognitive labor. Philosophy of Science, 82(3), 424–453.
  2. Grim, P. (2009). Threshold phenomena in epistemic networks. AAAI Fall Symposium: Complex Adaptive Systems and the Threshold Effect, 53–60.
  3. Hong, L., & Page, S. E. (2004). Groups of diverse problem solvers can outperform groups of high-ability problem solvers. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 101(46), 16385–16389.
  4. Kitcher, P. (1990). The division of cognitive labor. The Journal of Philosophy, 87(1), 5–22.
  5. Muldoon, R. (2013). Diversity and the division of cognitive labor. Philosophy Compass, 8(2), 117–125.
  6. Thoma, J. (2015). The epistemic division of labor revisited. Philosophy of Science, 82(3), 454–472.
  7. Weisberg, M., & Muldoon, R. (2009). Epistemic landscapes and the division of cognitive labor. Philosophy of Science, 76(2), 225–252.
  8. Zollman, K. J. S. (2010). The epistemic benefit of transient diversity. Erkenntnis, 72(1), 17–35.